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Abstract
Philosophers have relied heavily on the distinction between analytic truths and synthetic ones for 
various philosophical pursuits. In this paper I explore Immanuel Kant’s explanation of the distinction, 
W.V.O. Quine’s qualms with it, and the attempt of H.P. Grice and Strawson at saving synonymy in order 
to salvage analyticity from doubts. I conclude that although valiant, the efforts put forth by Grice 
and Strawson fall short. I argue that this is so because they attack a weak interpretation of Quine’s 
contention.
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The following paper is an evaluative assessment of the distinction between ana-
lytic and synthetic judgments. To do this I have examined Quine’s “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism”1 and Kant’s The Critique of Pure Reason2 to contrast the views that Quine 
and Kant had of this distinction. Whereas Kant was proud to make this distinction 
in an effort to revive the study of metaphysics, Quine eventually, after a long period 
of accepting the distinction, followed with a rejection of analyticity as it was used 
in metaphysics for establishing necessary truths; claiming that all explanations of 
analytic truths in that way are circular, “or something like a closed curve in space.”3 
Quine asserts that ‘necessity’ in the case of analytic statements does not do the work 
that past philosophers, such as Kant, wanted it to. I have also explored the criticisms 
of Quine put forth by Grice and Strawson in “In Defense of a Dogma”4 to see if they 
restore the analytic and synthetic distinction. I have mainly been concerned with the 
philosophical problem of establishing the possibility of objective necessary truths 
through the lenses of Kant, Quine, Grice, and Strawson. I intend to defend Quine by 
showing where Grice and Strawson fall short in their endeavor. Let us begin with Kant.
In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant attempts to answer the question of how synthet-
ic a priori knowledge is possible. I will begin by explaining the distinctions between 
ways of conceptualizing or making theoretical judgments of the world, according to 
Kant, then I will explain his view of metaphysics by way of the possibility of synthetic 
a priori judgments.
Kant distinguishes between a priori judgments that occur unconnected of all outside 
experiences and pure a priori judgments that happen completely free of experience 
without anything empirical intermixed. To highlight this distinction he uses an ex-
ample of a man whose house has a faulty foundation. Given a flaw in infrastructure 
one can expect without waiting to experience it that the house will fall in on itself, i.e., 
one can predict it a priori. Reasoning is done a priori by modus ponens to arrive at 
the conclusion: “If there’s a faulty foundation, then the house will collapse. I see that 
there is no foundation, therefore the house will collapse.” The sentences themselves 
that make up the premises are a posteriori. The a priori judgment is not pure since 
1 W.V.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Jan., 1951), pp. 
20-43
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1781
3 Ibid, 29
4 H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson,  “In Defense of a Dogma”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Apr., 
1956), pp. 141-158
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prior to, one must have had to experience the concept that bodies have weight and 
therefore fall when their base is compromised.5 This example shows a belief that is 
reached without immediate experience, but involves justification (of heavy bodies) 
that one can only arrive to by use of the senses. As a pure a priori judgment, Kant 
refers to the example that all effects have a cause.
In the endeavor of justifying our beliefs about the world we use assertions in different 
forms. Kant distinguishes between two kinds; the first I will discuss is the analytic. 
Analytic assertions are ones in which the predicate is contained in the concept of the 
subject. Kant writes,
In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is 
thought (if I only consider affirmative judgments, since the application to 
negative ones is easy) this relation is possible in two different ways. Either 
the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) 
contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside the concept A, though 
to be sure it stands in connection with it. In the first case, I call the judgment 
analytic, in the second synthetic.6
Kant also writes,
For [analytic judgments] do not through the predicate add anything to the 
concept of the subject; rather, they only dissect the concept, breaking it up 
into components which had already been thought in it (although thought 
confusedly).7
Moreover, these assertions would be contradictory when negated. Take for example, 
the assertion, “Every cat is feline,” ‘Cat’ is the subject that includes the predicate idea 
of ‘feline-ness’, which I can know without referring to every cat in the world. If I were 
to assert, “Not all cats are felines,” I would contradict the concept of “cat,” since being 
a cat implies also being feline. The idea is that analytic judgments are ones of clari-
fication, so they merely spell out something already contained in a concept. If I said 
I found a cat that is not a feline, you would reasonably say that what I found is not a 
cat because the two ideas are not so easily separable.
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B
6 Ibid, A6-7
7 Ibid, A7/B11
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Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, give us new information about the world. 
This is the case because, unlike analytic statements, the predicate is not contained 
in the subject. These judgments combine information and explain more than just 
the definition of a concept. If they are true, they amplify our knowledge by giving us 
new information, as opposed to clarifying details that are found in the investigation 
of a subject or concept. They can amplify the knowledge of someone who knows the 
meanings of the words, because they determine some state of affairs to be the case 
and excludes other states of affairs from being the case. Analytic statements do not 
determine anything, and are not informative to someone who knows the meaning of 
the words. For these types, Kant offers an example of physical bodies being heavy; 
whereas ‘bodies’ are the subject and ‘heavy’ is the predicate. By definition (at least 
for Kant), bodies are not necessarily heavy, so to deny that they are would not lead to 
a contradiction of what it means to be a body; that is, extended in space: 
Metaphysics is not at all concerned merely to dissect concepts of things 
that we frame a priori, and thereby elucidate them analytically. Rather, in 
metaphysics we want to expand our a priori cognition. In order to do this, 
we must use principles which go beyond the given concept and which add 
to it something that was not contained in it; and, by means of such synthetic 
a priori judgments, we must presumably go so far beyond such concepts 
that even experience can no longer follow us [...]8
Metaphysics is a matter of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments because, 
first, metaphysics must tell us something new about the world hence, synthetic; sec-
ond, we cannot know it through experience. Thus, we must know it a priori. So, we 
must have some non-trivial explanation of the world that amplifies truths that we 
can know without relying on sense-experience. Kant did not question the possibil-
ity of synthetic a priori judgments, because he believed that their possibility was al-
ready shown and contained in mathematics and all theoretical sciences of reason. 
Since metaphysics is considered one of these sciences, it follows that those synthetic 
a priori judgments are contained in this study as well.
In his paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Quine began with an explanation of what 
Kant meant by an analytic truth; that is, one of clarification, true as a consequence of 
their meanings, and separate from facts. Unlike Kant, Quine believed that there was 
no distinction to be made, or to be understood, between synthetic and analytic state-
ments, because statements of the analytic sort could not be sufficiently defined. He 
8 Ibid, B18
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claims that all attempts to adequately define analyticity are circular. He claims this 
because, as he explicates in the first sections of his paper, attempts to explain analyti-
city lead to the reliance on other ideas that are in just as much need of clarification as 
analyticity. The criteria are just as nebulous as what they seek to identify.
Quine makes a major distinction between meaning and naming, stating that one is 
not to be confused with the other. Quine uses the example, “the terms ‘9’ and ‘the 
number of planets’ they name one and the same abstract entity but presumably 
must be regarded as unlike in meaning […].”9 He goes on to distinguish between two 
kinds of analytic statements: ones that are logically true, and ones that can be turned 
into logical truths by the use of synonyms. 
1. No not-X is X
 a.  No unmarried man is married.
 b.  No non-dog is a dog. (Nothing that is not a dog is a dog.)
 c.  No non-car is a car. (Nothing that is not a car is a car.)
2. No bachelor is married. 
 a.  An ophthalmologist is an eye-doctor.
 b.  A vixen is a female fox.
 c.  A cat is a feline.
The first are considered logically true because they remain true under any replace-
ment of ‘X’, ‘man’ and ‘married’(here we can omit the reinterpretation of logical par-
ticles, or operators like, ‘not,’ ‘if then,’ ‘all,’ ‘or,’ ‘no,’ ‘some,’ etc.). Analytic statements 
of the second type might be formed into statements of the first by substituting ‘bach-
elor’ for ‘unmarried man’ (in 1a.). But this process is still unclear because it relies on 
synonymy, which is lacking in a “formal explanation” like analyticity. Statements of 
the second type are the ones Quine is concerned with because of this unclear notion 
of synonymy, and, by that means, analyticity, too.10
He goes on to describe how definitions, though seemingly to console the worry about 
synonymy, actually rely upon and presuppose synonymy also. Instead of pointing 
out that ‘unmarried man’ is synonymous with ‘bachelor’, one might say that one is 
the definition of the other. However, as Quine points out, the only way one can be 
9 W.V.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, p. 20
10 Ibid, p. 24
Volume 9, Issue 1Res Cogitans
6 | eP1175 Res Cogitans
sure that one defines the other is if we rely on synonymy. This is so because even if 
we take the lexicographer’s account of definitions, the lexicographer, as an empirical 
scientist, creates his definitions on the basis of a pre-existing relation of synonymy 
among words. This can be said to be true of anyone who attempts to define one word 
with another, as it is not just the lexicographer that creates definitions, but philoso-
phers and scientists alike.
Quine points out at that there exists an extreme case of definition in which “[the defi-
nition] does not hark back to prior synonymies at all; namely, the explicitly conven-
tional introduction of novel notations for purposes of sheer abbreviation.”11 A case 
of this form would be one such that the word to be defined is synonymous with the 
word defining it.12 This kind of case would consist of me making up a word; let us say, 
“Slatiblatfist.” Now I will ascribe the combination of “Zb3” to my new word “Slati-
blatfist.” Quine wants to say that there was no need to presuppose synonymy here 
because I have only shortened and represented “Slatiblatfist” by convention. For this 
reason Quine claims this as a “transparent case of synonymy created by definition”.13 
More simply, this is a case in which synonymy arises from definition, and not vice-
versa. Better examples can be found in math or logic; we write π instead of 3.14... But 
it is just a convention to use Greek letters in math. This is also contingent since all 
the mathematicians could have a meeting and change it if there was a better, more 
conventional symbol to use instead.
Quine’s criticism is not merely that the distinction is hopeless or unsatisfactorily ex-
plained. He goes a step further to say that the distinction is erroneous on part of 
the philosopher. The most prominent point for Grice and Strawson (hereafter GS) 
was to illustrate that Quine’s attacks on the proper characterization of the analytic/
synthetic distinction do not adequately warrant a complete denial of it. The lack of 
clarification of the distinction, GS want to say, is true of other distinctions that we 
utilize as well, but this does not make the distinctions illusory. Just because there is 
not a formal explanation of analytic statements does not lay good enough ground for 
the conclusion that they are fake-notions. 
This is not to say that the points Quine raises are not the beginning steps on the path 
to finding an adequate account of the analytic and like concepts. However, it is to 
11 Ibid, 26
12 Ibid, 26
13 Ibid, 26
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say that the points raised by Quine are not enough to prove that there is no such dis-
tinction. The distinction relies upon philosophical and ordinary usage. GS describe 
Quine’s rejection as a “philosopher’s paradox” in that the philosopher ignores an ex-
ploration into the usage of the notion of meaning the same, but instead the philoso-
pher sets a standard by which to measure the clarity of the notion. Then, since the 
notion fails the measurement, the philosopher rejects the existence of the notion and 
proclaims it illusory. 14 
GS explain that Quine’s analytic circle is such that, there is a group of phrases or con-
cepts in which the term “analytic” is a member along with “synonymous,” “defini-
tion,” “necessary,” “self-contradictory,” and “semantical rule,” etc.15 Of all of these 
members, if one should be adequately clarified, then the rest would be as well. GS 
note that Quine often refers to making “satisfactory sense” of expressions at this 
point. An exploration into what that would consist of could be of some use in our 
understanding of his circle. GS formulate what would constitute “satisfactory sense” 
and hence, the escape from the circle with two things: 
1. It would involve providing an explanation that does not incorporate any 
expression belonging to the family circle.
2. It seems that the explanation provided must be of the same general character 
as those rejected explanations that do incorporate members of the family 
circle.
In other words, “It should take the form of a pretty strict definition but should not 
make use of any member of a group of interdefinable terms to which the expression 
belongs.”16
GS combat this predicament of a difficult undertaking in two ways; the first is to claim 
that this criterion is not a necessary condition for a concept to make sense. They 
show this by giving examples of words that, although we have yet to precisely clarify 
them, we still make sense and use of. Words such as “morally wrong,” “blamewor-
thy,” “breach of moral rules,” “true,” “false,” “statement,” and “fact,” to name a few. 
GS expressed that it would be absurd to claim that since these words have yet to 
be given a formal explanation, we should therefore give up on their providing any 
14 In Defense of a Dogma, p. 147
15 Ibid, 147
16 Ibid, 148
Volume 9, Issue 1Res Cogitans
8 | eP1175 Res Cogitans
sense for us. They go on to say that just because an expression cannot be explained 
by Quine’s standard does not mean it cannot be explained in less formal ways. The 
second way they combat Quine’s standard is by giving an informal explanation of a 
member of the group, due to its complexity, for now we will say of it that GS break out 
of the “circle” by explaining a ‘logical impossibility’ without an appeal to other ideas 
in the family circle.17 
One of the key points of concern for GS is Quine’s claim of the extreme definition 
form. GS assert that if we accept Quine’s claim, pertaining to the case of ‘transparent 
synonymy,’ “[...] his position as a whole is incoherent.”18 To take their famous words 
on this, 
It is like the position of a man to whom we are trying to explain, say, the 
idea of one thing fitting into another thing, or two things fitting together, 
and who says: ‘I can understand what it means to say that one thing fits into 
another, or that two things fit together, in the case where one was specially 
made to fit the other; but I cannot understand what it means to say this in 
any other case.’19
In other words, GS question what correlation between concepts this process estab-
lishes, and why Quine thinks it is unfathomable to attribute the same (or similar) pro-
cess, or correlation, to situations of synonymy that are not so transparent. It appears 
unclear to GS that such a case of transparency cannot be applied to other cases be-
cause synonymy by convention seems to require the notion of synonymy by usage.
By this time we have explored Kant’s account of synthetic and analytic statements, 
parts of Quine’s rejection of such a distinction, and some of the rebuttal against this 
rejection given by GS. GS appear to revive Kant’s distinction, if not by expounding on 
it, at least by undermining Quine’s reasons for the repudiation of it. Although GS shed 
light on the shortcomings of Quine’s criticisms, they do not give a formal explana-
tion of analytic statements beyond Kant. After long time of push and pull, acceptance 
and denial, of analytic statements, we have as much of an explanation as we started 
with, with Kant. They are statements of clarification that are true in virtue of their 
meanings. What those meanings entail need not be defined with a formal explana-
17 Ibid, 150-151
18 Ibid, 152
19 Ibid, 152 
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tion since we have long standing philosophical usage of them. 
It is clear to see problems with the lack of clarity of the distinction so there is room to 
continue to strive for a formal explanation of analytic truths. Simply because we do 
not have the strict definition of analytic statements does not mean we should throw 
them by the wayside until we find one. We should continue to use those truths in our 
language and debates about them, in ways they have made sense for us in the past. 
Analytic truths, and thereby necessary truths, can still be made sense of even if we 
lack the exact sense of them. 
Although GS have given theoretical explanations for the existence of the distinction 
they do not get any clearer on the distinction. They do not directly answer the point 
of Quine’s contention. GS claim that the case of ‘transparent synonymy,’ taken seri-
ously, shows Quine’s project to be inconsistent. I argue here that they are misguided 
in this claim. Just because Quine shows one case of synonymy does not mean that 
the mysteries of the kind of synonymy he questions are solved. Quine could not deny 
synonymy, especially in such antiquated examples as “a bachelor is an unmarried 
man,” and I do not think he wished to. In the case of ‘transparency,’ the introduction 
of notation is by convention and does not rely on meanings. Whereas in the case of a 
‘bachelor’ being an ‘unmarried male’ the meanings of each term is important in their 
being synonymous. To show that there is a distinction is one thing; to show how it 
comes to be and it’s nature is another. The analyticity, and thereby synonymy, that 
Quine argues against are the kind that attempt to assert universal necessary truths. 
The point is that saying a truth is universal and necessary would mean that it could 
be no other way. However, Quine claims that these too are contingent and in being 
so cannot be universal and necessary.  So, although GS recognized and showed the 
existence of the distinction, they did not pursue inquiry into the nature of such a 
distinction.
